Supreme Court Rules on Preliminary Injunction Standard in Environmental Cases
Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down limits on Naval sonar training off the California coast that were imposed during litigation over sonar impacts on dolphins, whales, and other marine mammals.[1] In its decision, the Court reiterated the standard for issuing preliminary injunctions, focusing in particular on the requirements for a balancing of equities and consideration of the public interest.[2] Five justices joined in holding that the public interest in adequately training the Navy’s antisubmarine forces “plainly outweighs” conservationists’ interests in studying marine mammals that may be injured by sonar exercises.[3]
This case has a long procedural history. The underlying issue concerns the adequacy of the Navy’s NEPA analysis of sonar training exercises, and whether it should have prepared an Environmental Impact Statement. The district court first issued a blanket preliminary injunction against sonar exercises. The Navy made an emergency appeal, and the Ninth Circuit found that a preliminary injunction was appropriate, but that a blanket injunction was too broad.[4] On remand, the district court issued a new preliminary injunction imposing six conditions on sonar operations while the NEPA litigation runs its course. The Navy appealed two of those conditions, and it was the appropriateness of those two preliminary injunction conditions that was before the Supreme Court.[5]
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, began by restating the four well-established criteria for granting a preliminary injunction: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities between the parties; and (4) the public interest.[6] The majority’s analysis focused on the last two factors, which it concluded received only cursory treatment by the district court and the Ninth Circuit. For plaintiffs, the majority said, “the most serious possible injury would be harm to an unknown number of the marine mammals that they study and observe.”[7] The majority contrasted that interest with the importance of sonar training to the Navy’s preparedness for antisubmarine warfare. Describing the sonar training as “mission critical,” and essential to the preparedness of Naval strike groups, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the “balance of equities and consideration of the overall public interest in this case tip strongly in favor of the Navy.” He added: “Of course, military interests do not always trump other considerations, and we have not held that they do.”
Chief Justice Roberts also faulted the Ninth Circuit for requiring a showing of only the “possibility” of irreparable harm (the second element of the preliminary injunction standard).[8] The majority reiterated that to obtain preliminary relief a plaintiff is required to show that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.[9] However, the majority also noted that the district court had found that there was a “near certainty” of irreparable injury, so it was not clear that the Ninth Circuit’s error in articulating the standard had any effect on its analysis of irreparable harm in this case.[10]
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote separately, concurring that the preliminary injunction should be vacated, and Justice Stevens joined in his analysis of the preliminary injunction issue. Justice Breyer also dissented from the result, in a portion of his opinion not joined by Justice Stevens, and would have left in place the additional conditions the Ninth Circuit imposed in its stay of the contested injunction conditions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice David Souter joined.
For more information about the Court’s decision, please contact Svend Brandt-Erichsen or any member of Marten Law Group’s Environmental Litigation practice group.
